









1.1 East Asia: An Emerging Region within the Global System

East Asia is a region having arguably more impact on the global system than any other. It has achieved one of the most profound economic transformations in recorded history. In the 1950s and 1960s, East Asia was a relatively poor developing part of the world, with countries such as South Korea having comparable income per capita and development levels on par with many sub-Saharan African states. The region accounted for only 4 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960. By the 1990s, East Asia had become one of three core economic regions (along with Europe and North America) that together dominated the world economy, accounting for 25 percent of world GDP by 1995. By the mid-2010s that share was approaching 30 percent. Japan had first spearheaded East Asia’s economic rise up to the 1990s, and then China became the major force behind the region’s economic momentum. These two countries are among the world’s three largest national economies, but East Asia is also host to the highest concentration of newly industrialised economies (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam) found anywhere in the world. The trade and financial surpluses generated by East Asian countries are second to none. The region is also making an increasing major contribution to world trade, production, new technology patents and gross domestic product. It is also the home of some of the world’s largest multinational enterprises. East Asia’s impact of the key global challenges facing humanity in the 21st century – climate change, energy security, development gaps, resource scarcity and competition – is also of growing vital importance. 

It could even be argued that the very concept of an ‘East Asia’ region principally derived from burgeoning studies on its growing prominence in the international economic system. In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars gradually began to ditch the antiquated, Western-centric referent ‘Far East’ for the region, and the distinction between ‘East Asia’ and ‘Asia’ was increasingly used to specify where exactly on the vast continent the profound economic transformation was actually occurring on a specific regional (rather than continental) scale. Moreover, East Asia’s economic advance was in many ways founded on certain regional dynamics, and this explains why we often talk of the East Asian ‘economic miracle’ or the East Asian development model, and hence a particular coherence to East Asia’s regional economic development. For example, many countries in the region emulated Japan’s ‘developmental state’ paradigm of state-business partnered capitalism and export-oriented industrialisation with generally successful effect. 

East Asian countries learned from each other’s lessons of development and implemented many similar policies, leading to some extent to a shared development experience. Also, Japanese firms played an initially crucial role in helping integrate the East Asian regional economy through networked trade and investment. European and American companies too contributed to this process through foreign investments made across the region. In addition, after many of East Asia’s less developed countries had graduated to newly industrialised, middle income economy status they began to trade and invest more with each other. This further deepened East Asia’s regional economic interdependence. While the export-oriented nature of East Asia’s economic development made it highly dependent on global markets, countries in the region had become increasingly beholden to each other. The region’s 1997/98 financial crisis clearly revealed the inter-linkages that bound together East Asia’s economies in ways that were arguably then not fully appreciated. Various integrative forces continue to bind the region together at the economic, political, social and other levels, although these processes were also constituent to wider global-scale integrative developments commonly referred to as globalisation. Indeed, the 2008/09 global financial crisis pulled East Asia’s major economies more firmly into the global arena, focusing more on managing issues of global governance with the effect of diverting them somewhat from regional economic co-operation (Beeson 2011, Katada 2011). 

A comprehensive study of East Asia as an ‘economic region’ requires us to extend beyond the disciplinary focus of economics to include many other fields, especially international relations, security studies, political science, history, business, geography, environment, energy and sociology. As we later discuss in more detail, the international political economy approach with its emphasis on multi-disciplinarity is able to embrace these different fields and offer valuable holistic perspectives on the study of regionalism. This book’s study on East Asian regionalism is hence a work of international political economy (IPE) analysis. Its main objective is to consider to what extent is East Asia becoming, and will become an increasingly coherent (economic) region within the structure of the international or global system. 

There appear, however, to be various factors stacked against the deepening of East Asian regionalism. East Asia is probably the most diverse region in the world in terms of economic development, political governance, socio-cultural profile, socio-religious traditions and other defining characteristics (Table 1.1). Moreover, it is a region marked by historic animosities between rival nations, of where conflicts still persist between old and new states alike, and where nationalism remains a potent force in many countries of the region. Since the late 2000s there have been intensified territorial disputes in the South China Sea, East China Sea and northern Borneo. The border between North and South Korea remains the most militarised zone in the world, with both nation-states still technically at war with each other. East Asia therefore would seem to face a special set of challenges in the endeavour of regional community-building. 

And yet over the last two decades or so East Asia has in many ways strengthened its integration and coherence as a regional entity. This is evident in deepening region-wide economic exchange (e.g. trade, investment, and financial flows), transnational business operations, cross-border infrastructural linkages, international policy co-operation and co-ordination, regional diplomacy, social movements, shared popular culture, and various socialisation processes among the peoples and societies of East Asia. There has been a significant expansion of intra-regional contacts through improved transportation and communication technologies, tourism, migration, business and social media networking. A growing density of social communications within a region can engender a sense of shared identity and community amongst the involved participants (Cohen 2002, Deutsch 1957, 1966; Pempel 2005a).

At the same time East Asia is regionally integrating there remains some debate concerning what is actually meant by ‘East Asia’ in geographic terms. For example, from a ‘map’ perspective it would seem that the Russian Far East should be included in the region (Figure 1.1) but invariably it is not considered part of the East Asia regional community. This may be because it is a peripheral sub-national region within an essentially Eurocentric country, Russia, and also because of its marginal at best engagement in East Asia’s regional economic dynamic and integrational processes. This latter point is also relevant to explaining why Mongolia is so often overlooked as a constituent East Asian nation in regional groupings and regional organisation membership. One could even argue that for the Russian Far East and Mongolia to be more readily acknowledged as part of East Asia that they need to appear more clearly on the regional economic radar. There have indeed been recent signs of this, due mainly to emerging resource-based relationships both are developing with their Northeast Asian neighbour countries of China, Japan and South Korea in particular. 

In addition, some observers prefer to distinguish Southeast Asia as a distinctly separate entity to East Asia, and in this geographic division East Asia becomes what others would normally refer to as Northeast Asia.​[1]​ The definitional parameters of regions often seem in a constant state of flux, as especially revealed in debates over country eligibility to regional organisation membership. This has long been the case in Europe regarding European Union membership (e.g. Turkey’s accession), and it has become an increasingly relevant issue for East Asia. For example, the East Asia Summit (EAS) process that was initiated in December 2005 originally included India (normally grouped with South Asia), Australia and New Zealand, two countries usually classified as belonging to the Oceania region. There were political motives behind Japan’s advocacy of incorporating these three countries, which was at first opposed by China and others, but the main point here is that one person’s East Asia may be different to another’s. Furthermore, the Southeast Asia region is primarily a geopolitical construct of the Cold War period. Up into the 1940s, Southeast Asian territories were generally viewed especially by Western colonial powers as integral to a wider ‘East Indies’ region that included the Indian sub-continent. As Hettne (2005) argued, “there are no ‘natural’ regions: definitions of a ‘region’ vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation” (pg. 2). Thus, references to particular regions can often be highly contested.

For the purposes of clarity this book will refer to East Asia as a composite of two sub-regional elements, namely: Southeast Asia – Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
; Northeast Asia – Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, Hong Kong SAR​[2]​, Macau SAR, Mongolia and Taiwan
. This being said, our analysis of East Asian regionalism will show that extra-regional factors (e.g. third countries, transnational business, global-level issues) are also highly relevant. Much attention, for instance, is made in the regionalism literature concerning the importance of the United States in East Asia’s regional political economy (Beeson 2006a, 2006b; Park 2013; Press-Barnathan 2014). East Asia is itself part of a wider Asia-Pacific trans-region that incorporates Pacific-coast America (North America and Latin America elements) and Oceania. Studies of East Asia are often situated in an Asia-Pacific context mainly owing to strengthening trans-regional economic links across the Pacific over recent decades (Ariff 1991, Dent 2013a, Garnaut and Drysdale 1994, Islam and Chowdhury 1997, Lee 2002, Zhang 2003). Furthermore, the transnational business activities integrating East Asia together at a micro-level are often part of global production and distribution networks of firms that originate from outside the region. These linkages give East Asian regionalism an extra-dimensional aspect, and studying it thus requires us to consider related developments occurring at the wider international or global level. The extra-dimensional nature of East Asian regionalism is a core theme of the concluding Chapter 8.





1.2 Regionalism: Key Concepts and Definitions

Regionalism is one of the key defining features of the contemporary international system. We increasingly talk of ‘East Asia’, ‘Europe’, ‘North Africa’ and ‘South America’ and so on as distinctive regions or regional communities that are elemental parts of world society. Indeed, it has been argued that we now live in a ‘world of regions’, and an international system increasingly defined by interactions between regions and regional powers (Buzan and Waever 2003, Katzenstein 2005). Thus, the study of regionalism is now a crucial element of studying the international system generally. Moreover, understanding how regionalism has developed in East Asia is also critically important given its increasing global significance.

Regionalism is, of course, not a wholly new phenomenon, but it has become an important discourse in the study of international relations and international political economy for the above reasons. Regionalism is also a contested concept, not least because regionalism manifests itself in different ways in different parts of the world and can be understood from multiple perspectives. In broad terms, we may refer to regionalism as the structures, processes and arrangements that are working towards greater coherence within a specific international region in terms of economic, political, security, socio-cultural and other kinds of linkages. These may arise either as a result of: (i) micro-level processes arising from regional concentrations of inter-connecting private or civil sector activities, and this may be specifically referred to as regionalisation; or (ii) public policy initiatives, such as a free trade agreement or other state-led projects of economic co-operation and integration that originate from inter-governmental dialogues and treaties, which may be specifically referred to as regionalism when contrasted to regionalisation. 

In this context, regionalism is thus more of a policy-driven, top-down process while regionalisation is more of a societal-driven, bottom-up process. Various levels of interaction exist between both processes. For example, a motive behind the regionalist policy initiatives of governments is to further exploit the prosperity-generating potential of regionalisation, and these policy initiatives may not be formulated in the first place without there being a sufficient level of regionalisation in which to ground them. Regionalisation may in turn be enhanced by state-led regionalism projects. To many observers, regionalism and regionalisation are synonymous terms, but it is often the case that ‘regionalism’ is used as the generic referent for both processes. 

Many if not the majority of studies on regionalism focus primarily on its economic dimension. This is because economic regionalism is by and large the most pronounced and well known form within the international system. Commonly cited manifestations of economic regionalism are the European Union’s ‘Single Market’ and ‘euro zone’, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercosur common market (in South America), South African Customs Union, Gulf Co-operation Council (in the Middle East), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. Whereas economic regionalism is mainly concerned with regional level trade, investment and financial inter-linkages, political regionalism generally refers to integral formations in the region’s political community, involving the development of transnational policy-networks, the expression of shared political interests amongst the region’s leaders, advancements in policy-co-ordination and common policy enterprises, and the creation of region-level institutions to manage any common ‘political space’ formed between the region’s nation-states. 

The European Union (EU) exhibits by far the most advanced levels of political regionalism in the international system. Security regionalism can to some extent be expressed in political terms, especially if traditional politico-military notions of security are upheld. More generally, security regionalism traditionally refers to the growing commitment between a region’s military powers to form common security arrangements that assure peace for the region as a whole. This can entail non-aggression pacts, alliance partnerships and various co-operative activities in the security domain. Broadening definitions of ‘security’ to include new security sectors (e.g. energy, environment, food, water, human, etc.) have provided new approaches to, and understandings of security-focused regionalism and regional co-operation in the early 21st century (Buzan et al 1998; Collins 2007; Dent 2010a, 2013a; Stares 1998). Moreover, these new security sectors are strongly economic-related, thus creating closer linkages between them and traditional domains of international economics, such as trade and energy, foreign direct investment and environment, and so on (see Chapter 7). By way of illustration, one of the most important recent initiatives to arise from APEC diplomacy in 2011 was a trans-regional Asia-Pacific trade liberalisation agreement on environment goods, which was subsequently multilateralised to become a World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade negotiation process, as is further discussed in Chapter 6. We may also talk about socio-cultural regionalism in relation to how a region’s society may develop its own sense of common identity. Underlying this is how we may consider regions as being socio-culturally or socio-politically constructed, and this is discussed later when we consider social constructivist perspectives on regionalism.





1.3 Studying Regionalism: Classic Regionalism and New Regionalism Theories

The study of regionalism has changed significantly over time. A prime reason for this is that different forms of regionalism have evolved in response to changing conditions and developments within the international system, such as globalisation. ‘Classic’ or traditional theories of regionalism arose out of scholarly work of the 1950s and 1960s, with Europe being the principal focus. Viner (1950) is acknowledged as the original theorist in this area, and his work was later refined and built upon by Meade (1955), Gehrels (1956), Lipsey (1970), Balassa (1961), Michaely (1965) and others. Their empirical and theoretical work was largely preoccupied with how regional integration can progress in a generally linear fashion over five different levels or stages. These are outlined in order below:

	Free trade area or agreement (FTA): the mutual removal of all tariff, quota and other trade restrictions among signatory members. Each member, however, retains the ability to formulate its own trade policy towards non-members. 
	Customs union: extends an FTA arrangement to include the adoption of a common external tariff (CET), and thus the basis of a common trade policy. All members apply the same CETs upon non-member imports entering the customs union.
	Common or internal markets: extends a customs union to involve the elimination of the barriers that impede the free movement of goods, services, people and capital.
	Economic and monetary union: extends a common or internal market by its members adopting a common currency. Monetary union requires members to collaborate more closely on a variety of economic policies, e.g. on fiscal, social and industrial policies. This is because with monetary union the spillovers from one policy domain into others become more extensive, e.g. between monetary policy and tax policy.
	Economic and political union: the ultimate stage of regional integration. Members embrace federal union, essentially becoming a unified state. The United States, Germany and Italy are important historical examples of such a union. 

Of those listed above, free trade agreements (FTAs) are by far the most prevalent form of economic integration in the world, and a number of customs unions have been established (Figure 1.2). While some regional groupings such as Mercosur have aspired to a common market, only the EU has a robust common or ‘single’ market in place. Furthermore, the EU is the only regional group in modern times that has established a comprehensively functioning economic and monetary union, although various regional currency arrangements exist such as the CFA franc currency system​[3]​ in West and Central Africa, and East Asia’s Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralised (CMIM) system of currency swap arrangements (see Chapter 5). A few regional groups often adopt a ‘multi-speed’ approach to integration mainly in accordance to notable development asymmetries existing among its members. For example, the less developed countries of ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – or CLMV) have longer to comply with the integrational targets of the AEC than the more developed ASEAN-6 economies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  This is generally because the CLMV sub-group have relatively weak development capacities (e.g. technocratic, institutional, infrastructural), and therefore need longer periods of adjustment and implementation. 

For much of the Cold War period, Euro-centric thinking and empirics on regionalism dominated the field. Other regions invariably looked to Europe as the model on which to develop their own regionalist projects, primarily because the EU and its antecedents (e.g. the European Community) remained by some considerable degree the world’s most comprehensive and sophisticated form of regionalism. The EU has been a long-standing pathfinder in regional integration, particularly with regard to institution-building and treaty-based aspects of this process. From a theoretical perspective, there are four mainstream Euro-centric concepts of regional integration, these being:

	Functionalism: based on early 20th century ideas of how to most effectively manage international integration and interdependence generally through the establishment of functional agencies, especially multilateral organisations, which work alongside both state and non-state actors (Mitrany 1933). It is premised on the notion that nation-states alone are not able to work independently when tackling the challenges of an integrating world, and has close theoretical links with idealism and neo-liberal institutionalism discussed later in the chapter.
	Neo-functionalism: a derivative theory of functionalism that is particularly focused on regional integration (Haas 1958, 1961). Regional institutions or agencies are required to manage areas of integration, initially in core economic sectors like trade and industry. Over time, these institutions extend the scope of regional co-operation as functional ‘spillovers’ arise when it becomes clear that more sectors become closer inter-linked to the core sectors, for example trade and infrastructure, or trade and energy. This functional expansion of regional co-operation and institutionalism progresses as regional integration processes themselves advance. By way of historical illustration, the EU started with the functional integration of the coal and steel industry in early 1950s, then moved onto trade and finance by the late 1950s, and thereafter expanded the European integration agenda into a myriad of economic, political, security, science and technology, and socio-cultural fields by the 1990s.
	Neo-federalism: linked to neo-functionalism, and focuses more on issues of political governance. It is an extension of ideas of federal government at the national level to the international regional level, where supranational agencies like the European Commission, European Court of Justice, European Central Bank and European Parliament are formed to create an institutional, legislative and technocratic structure to manage, as well as promote, regional integration (Pinder 1986). More broadly, this process creates a federal group of nation-states bound together by this core structure.
	Inter-governmentalism: this theoretical approach claims the ultimate primacy of the nation-state and thereby national governments in determining key decisions on regional integration, and the pace and scope of that integration. It thus counters neo-functional and ne-federalist ideas of powerful supranational institutions, and the inevitable expansion of functional integration and co-operation, and has close connections with neo-realist theories of international relations, as we later discuss. 

However, as regionalism became a more widespread and salient feature of the international system, scholars began to increasingly question the usefulness of Euro-biased, classic integration theories (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, Gamble and Payne 1996, Katzenstein 2000, Poon 2001). It was evident that regionalism was evolving in different ways around the world for two main reasons. First, the development of regionalism was a highly endogenous process, being shaped by various economic, socio-cultural, political and historic path dependent factors that are locally situated or embedded, which therefore did not lend to a uniformity of experience (Hameiri 2013, Hettne and Söderbaum 2000): the nature of regionalism varied depending on where you found it. Second, the world now was a different place to when the fundaments of classic integration theory were first developed. Major structural transformations in the international system have occurred since, especially from after the end of the Cold War, and this presented opportunities for new innovative forms of regionalism to emerge (Milner 1998). Perhaps most importantly on this point, globalisation has led to a shift away from the past emphasis on introverted, defensive regional blocs during the Cold War bipolarity period to more outward-looking and flexible forms of regional co-operation and integration in a world where trade and other economic barriers between global or macro-regions (e.g. Europe, East Asia, Latin America) are diminishing whilst global systems of connectivity between them are strengthening. 

Thus, classic integration theory has gradually given way to new regionalism theory (NRT), especially outside the mainstream economics field (Boas et al 2005, Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, Gamble and Payne 1996, Hettne 2005, Larner and Walters 2002, MacLeod 2001, Mansfield and Milner 1999,  Storper 1997). Many disciplinary fields have contributed to NRT’s development, most importantly international political economy, political science, international relations, sociology and economic geography. This more holistic and multi-disciplinary approach has enabled us to move well beyond the narrow economistic approach of classic integration theory and its limitations in understanding the fuller political, social and other causes and consequences of economic regionalism (Mansfield and Milner 1999). From a more political science perspective, European regional integration also became less of a model and more of a benchmark for particular institutionalised paths of regionalism (Dieter 2006). 

Moreover, NRT does not deny the importance of institutions in advancing regional integration and co-operation, but rather takes a much broader view on their role. Dieter (2006) reminds us that institutions help reduce transaction costs, lower uncertainty amongst agents, facilitate deal-making, ensure compliance, are vehicles for learning and socialisation, and help shape collective identities with regard to developing regionalist projects. Furthermore, new regionalism theorists have sought to broaden our understanding of what we mean by ‘region’. Rafael (1999) for instance suggests that a region may be defined as “that which can be alternately or simultaneously appear in various guises: politically as an administrative unit, culturally as an ethnic enclave or linguistic community, economically as zones of production and exchange” (pg. 1208). 

Economic geographers have particularly highlighted how the transnational business activities and systems are creating new regional (or sub-regional) economic spaces that cut across national economies (Olds et al 1999, Borrus et al 2000). The business or market-led driving forces behind this trend is perhaps better characterised as regionalisation rather than regionalism, although governments do invariably foster the development of these so called ‘growth polygons’ (e.g. the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle) that are especially prevalent in East Asia (see Chapter 2). What economic geographers have stressed is to think about regional or sub-regional economic coalescence in different geo-spatial terms than before: regionalist projects do not always comprise a collection of whole national economies with neatly defined borders. Furthermore, regionalisation tends to involve linkages between particular sub-national and transnational economic zones within a macro-region like East Asia, and therefore patterns of integration within a region can be highly asymmetric, as discussed in the following chapter. 

The social construction of regions, and therein regionalism itself, is another distinctive strand to new regionalism theory, although sociological perspectives on regional group development date back some time. For example, during the time of the EEC’s emergence, Deutsch (1957) contended that increased communication amongst states and societies can help create a sense of community among them by developing trust, establishing mutual interests and an appropriation of ‘we-ness’. Wendt (1992), Hurrell (1995) and others have brought new social constructivist ideas and perspectives to the study of regionalism. For Hurrell (1995), the study of regionalism entails the method of “conceptualising the interaction between material incentives, inter-subjective structures, and the identity and interests of the actors” (pg. 72) with regard to the region. Growing interdependences within a globalising world are creating new transnational communities of common interest, and a sense of ‘regionness’ derives from this process where patterns of economic and political transactions and social communications are concentrated within particular regional spaces, that may in turn be differentiated from other regionalised communities (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000, Wendt 1992). 

The idea of regional community-building itself may be considered a concept that derives mainly from new regionalism theory (Hurrell 1995, Hettne 2005). It may be broadly conceived as fostering closer co-operative relations among a region’s constituent states, peoples, organisations and other agencies with the overarching aim of strengthening regional economic, political and social cohesion. Here, community-building and cohesion are inter-determinate terms, both inferring how community members become increasingly beholden to each other: states become part of a regional whole, society or neighbourhood. This arises from the identification or formation of common regional interests – due invariably to revealed or cultivated linkages of interdependence – and according actions taken at the regional level intended to best manage or govern those interests. Some level of regional identity-formation may emerge from this process, yet what is ultimately essential is the substantial development of co-operative and harmonious relations within a regional community. This is especially important where conflict has been the norm in particular aspects of a region’s international relations, as is the case for East Asia. Furthermore, regional community-building should also make positive contributions towards the broader development of international society by regional communities providing more rationalised and integrated building blocs for developing global governance structures and frameworks. 

Finally, whereas classic regionalism theory is primarily focused on state actors, new regionalism theory stresses the importance of non-state actors, societal forces and multilateral institutions in the development of regionalism, in its various guises. There is hence corresponding plurality in both the different forms of regionalism and the different stakeholder influences – including norms of behaviour – that can shape its nature and direction (Acharya 2004). In sum, new regionalism may be contrasted with classic regionalism theory by its particular emphasis on: 

	multiple and co-existent levels and forms of regional co-operation and integration, e.g. state-driven, market-driven; sub-regional, trans-regional
	a less technocratically determined and more socially constructed or ideational view to understanding regional community-building
	connections between regionalism and extra-regional processes and structures at the global and multilateral levels. 





1.4 Regionalism in the International System

1.4.1 Regionalism and Globalisation

Regionalism, or regionalisation is closely linked to the phenomenon of globalisation. If globalisation can be thought about fundamentally as increasing levels of connectivity, integration and interdependence between different parts of the world economy and society occurring on a global (i.e. worldwide) scale, then regionalism and regionalisation is about how this is arising on a regional scale.​[4]​ As Hettne (2005) observed, regionalism and globalisation are closely related aspects of contemporary transformations in the world order. Furthermore, in the flux and structural change in the international system brought on by the forces of globalisation, nation-states have often lacked the independent or autonomous resources to sufficiently address the opportunities and threats posed by globalisation. Working together in regional associations and groups has, however, made this more possible based on collectively pooled strengths, resources and preferences (Dent 1997). East Asia’s regionalism should, then, be viewed in the context of globalisation-related developments (Beeson 2007). 

While some maintain that regionalism is a building bloc of globalisation, others have taken the view that regionalism fragments the international system into separate and disconnected competing blocs – a kind of ‘closed regionalism’ – and thus works against the development of globalisation and global society. In George Orwell’s political novel, ‘1984’, the world was engaged in constant global conflict between the three rival regions – Oceania, Eurasia and East Asia! Although not too long ago there were real fears that such a dystopian future may emerge in the early 21st Century, this has fortunately not transpired. Although inter-regional relations (e.g. East Asia and Europe) have become an important new feature of the world system, these have generally helped bridge links between regional communities and made a positive contribution to the development of global society (Dent 2004, 2012; Gilson 2002). 

Over the last decade or so, there have been important new developments in the regionalism – globalisation relationship arising from both key structural changes in the international system and key challenges facing humanity in the 21st century. Regarding the first issue, increasing attention has been afforded to the rise of the ‘Global South’, or emerging new powers – primarily large developing countries – and how this is gradually undermining the global dominance of Western developed countries. The so called BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is viewed as the primary tier of these ‘emerging powers’, followed by secondary tier groupings such as the MINT group (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey). Many analysts believe this is creating a more multipolar world in which fast growing developing country economies (and often their populations) will exercise greater weight and influence in global relations and matters of global governance. The expansion of the G8 group to the G20 arrangement in the late 2000s – which accommodated most BRICS and MINT nations as new members – clearly indicated this global structural change. Most relevantly, many of these countries are rising ‘regional powers’ that are leading nations from their respective regional communities or neighbourhoods: for example, Brazil in South America, Nigeria in West Africa, India in South Asia, South Africa in Southern Africa, China in East Asia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. The extent to which countries are able to exploit their regional powerbase for wider international gain, or exercise regional leadership on a broader international stage remains generally limited. However, this could change over time, especially as their home regions become more integrated, coherent entities. This would further augment the development of a more multi-polar, region-structured world where regional interests were in some way championed by regional leaders (Dent 2008a). 





1.4.2 Regional Economic Organisations and Frameworks

Studies of regionalism often begin by outlining regional organisations and frameworks that exist around the world by way of demonstrating its global pervasiveness. This is a good entry point for many, and indeed this chapter has already listed a few examples. Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2 map out and detail the world’s main regional economic organisations and frameworks. Regional ‘economic’ organisations and frameworks have been chosen because this book is primarily an international political economy based study, and moreover there are still relatively few regional organisations and frameworks in which economic-related matters are not core to their agendas. For further purposes of clarification, regional economic ‘agreements’ often derive from regional organisations or frameworks (e.g. AEC from ASEAN), or may be considered a framework of some kind when they exist in their own right, such as NAFTA. These agreements can, however, mark the progressive integrational development of regional organisations associated with classic regionalism theory noted earlier (e.g. free trade agreements, customs unions) as illustrated in Figure 1.2.

Keeping in mind, then, the aforementioned analytical limitations of classic integration theory, Figure 1.2’s global ‘mapping’ of regionalism primarily focuses on state-led or institutionalised regional economic projects. We can see that the levels of integration and co-operation reached amongst the world’s regional economic organisations and frameworks vary significantly. The integrative prominence of the EU was noted earlier, possessing the world’s only fully functional economic and monetary union and common market arrangements. Apart from the EU, there are only six regional customs unions currently in operation, two in Africa (SACU and EAC), one in Central Asia (EAEC) and three in Latin America (CARICOM, CAN and Mercosur): moreover, two of these (EAEC and CARICOM) are in effect partial custom unions. In addition to these are nine regional free trade area arrangements (that have not progressed to customs union integration): SADC and TFTA in Africa; EFTA and the EEA in Europe; CISFTA in Central Asia; NAFTA in North America; CER and PICTA in Oceania; AFTA in East Asia (see Table 1.2). The CER between Australia and New Zealand is strictly a bilateral rather than a regional FTA. In fact, the vast majority of FTAs are bilateral in nature. From 1997 to 2015, the number of FTAs worldwide had increased from around 70 to well over 300, and nearly 90 percent of these were bilateral agreements. Some of these involve region-to-country agreements, such as the ASEAN–China FTA and the EFTA–South Korea FTA, and the relationship between trade bilateralism and regionalism is discussed in depth in Chapter 6. 

Returning to the map and outline of regional economic organisations and frameworks in Figure 1.2 and corresponding Table 1.2, we can see that a large remainder have only operationalised so called ‘partial scope’ regional trade agreements. These are essentially sub-FTA arrangements whereby only a selection of product lines are eligible for reciprocated free trade treatment between signatory countries​[5]​, and Figure 1.2 illustrates how many of Africa’s main regional trade frameworks fall into this category (CEMAC, COMESA, UEMOA/WAEMU), while the Agadir Agreement, SAARC and GCC group have still to implement the core of their respectively planned regional free trade areas. 

The actual integrity and effectiveness of a regional economic integration arrangement can also vary considerably for a number of reasons. The first is that developing countries especially often lack the technocratic, infrastructural and institutional capacities to operationalise these arrangements in a meaningful way. If the ensuing regulatory and enforcement gaps are significant, this will lead many to question the usefulness of the agreement concerned. A second problem that also tends to affect developing countries relates to intra-regional trade ratios. These tend to be low for poorer developing country groups in particular because their main trade partners are invariably outside their regional group, mainly owing to income level and industry capacity factors. Many may question the usefulness of a regional trade agreement if intra-regional trade accounts for only a small percentage of the group’s total trade. For some developing country regions this ratio may be as low as 5 to 10 percent, and for Southeast Asia / ASEAN this is only just over 20 percent. 

These figures contrast notably with the EU’s intra-regional trade ratio of well over 60 percent. This point overlaps somewhat with the third issue in that state-led regional economic projects per se may mask the lack of regionalised micro-level activities and linkages generally within a region, i.e. regionalisation. Regional economic organisations and frameworks essentially frame the macro-perspective or the institutional architecture of regionalism within the international system. While they are often premised on exploiting deepening regionalised business and other societal activities, regional organisations and frameworks are only able to tell part of the regionalism story. Chapter 2, for example, shows that economic regionalisation in East Asia has developed to a relatively high level in comparison to other regions. This is despite East Asia’s latecomer entry into the state-led regionalism trend. Furthermore, developing country regional groups appear to be affording increasing priority to improving infrastructural connectivity and other matters of trade facilitation, as well as regional economic security related issues such as energy, food, resources and labour migration. This is in part because trade liberalisation endeavours alone are evidently not deemed sufficient to significantly boost regional trade flows, and greater complementary efforts are required on improving supply-side, development capacity factors (ADB 2010, 2012a, 2012b). 

Table 1.2 shows that East Asia was a relative later-comer to state-led regionalism, only embarking on this form of regionalism in the 1990s. Most other regions had initiated regional projects in the 1950s and 1960s. SACU’s antecedent even dates back to the 1910s. Southeast Asia, or ASEAN, has thus far led the way for the East Asia region. The core of the AFTA’s agreement was implemented by 2003, and by the end of 2015 the main elements of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) common market were in place, with remaining elements to be phased in over the next few years, especially for the weaker CLMV economies. After less than three years of its inaugural summit meeting, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework had established regional network of bilateral currency swap agreements – the Chiang Mai Initiative – that was devised to help avert another regional financial crisis. In 2010 this network was consolidated into a singular regional system, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralised (CMIM), based on a US$240 billion fund and managed by a new East Asian regional institution, the Asian Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) based in Singapore. Chapter 5 explores how other efforts to improve regional financial governance in East Asia are occurring through the APT framework in conjunction with the Asian Development Bank and national governments, such as the Asian Bond Market Initiative. Here, we also discuss though how the momentum behind deepening institutionalised regional financial co-operation and integration appears to have slowed since the late 2000s, and moreover China and other East Asian states have sought to globalise this co-operation. 

Dieter (2006) and others have noted that the APT framework’s primary focus on regional financial integration presents an alternative path to trade integrational approach of classic regionalism theory. Aspects of ‘financial regionalism’ are evident in other parts of world (Fritz and Metzger 2005). For example, UEMOA/WAEMU’s uses the CFA franc as a basic regional currency unit, the EU has its euro, and the North American Framework Agreement operates a set of bilateral currency swaps amongst the NAFTA member countries of the US, Canada and Mexico (Henning 2002). However, it is the centrality of regional financial governance in the APT framework that makes it somewhat unique. Like ASEAN and the emerging EAS process, the APT’s agenda addresses a number of transnational issues that affect the whole region, such as those of a more general economic, social, health-related (e.g. SARS), crime-related (e.g. drug trafficking, piracy) or environmental nature. These make up the broader foundation on which regional community-building can be fostered and developed. Regional organisations (e.g. ASEAN) or frameworks (e.g. APT)​[6]​ rather than ‘stand-alone’ regional agreements tend to have broader transnational issue agendas that focus on enhancing regional co-operation among the organisation’s member states. Good examples of this are SADC in Southern Africa and Mercosur in Latin America. This point is related to the one made earlier on the increasing emphasis placed on infrastructural connectivity and addressing regional economic security related issues. Singular regional economic agreements such NAFTA on the other hand tend to be more commercially oriented, simply concerned with boosting economic transactions within the region, although as noted earlier many of these agreements are embedded within regional organisations (e.g. AFTA and ASEAN) and therefore form part of a wider regional community-building endeavour.

East Asian states have in recent years become members of various regional organisations, frameworks and agreements, many of these having overlapping and sometimes concentric memberships and involving a number of regional neighbourhoods on East Asia’s periphery. This is illustrated in Figure 1.3, which shows that most of these have East Asian states as the core basis of their memberships. A notable exception is the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), established in 2001 as a Chinese government initiative and whose other member countries are Russia, the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with new members India and Pakistan joining in 2016. The SCO’s principle aims are to advance regional co-operation (rather than integration) in economic, energy, security and cultural affairs. There are other more minor state-based regional agreements involving East Asian nations not indicated in Figure 1.3. For example, in 2005China, Laos, South Korea, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka upgraded the Bangkok Agreement (first signed in 1975) to a more substantial ‘partial scope’ agreement that extended the original tariff liberalisation list from 1,800 to 4,800 products and entailed higher tariff reduction rates than previously agreed.​[7]​ A year earlier in 2004, Thailand signed an enhanced BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) agreement with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka that committed these countries to abolish tariffs amongst them by 2017. 

In addition there are various sub-regional arrangements to which, East Asian states are party (discussed in the following chapter, e.g. the Greater Mekong Subregion) as well as sector-based regional co-operation initiatives, e.g. Network of Asian River Basin Organisations, Southeast Asia Water Utilities Network (ADB 2011). While these wider regional agreements and frameworks may only be making minor contributions to the development of regionalism, they are nevertheless further evidence of how East Asia is enmeshed in broader processes of international economic integration and co-operation that lie outside the region. This connects with the issue of how the geo-spatial and other boundaries of regionalism are often contested. Further discussion on this and other extra-dimensional aspects of East Asian regionalism can be found in Chapter 8. 


1.4.3 The Security and Geopolitical Dimensions of East Asian Regionalism

Regional economic organisations and frameworks emerge out of a complex interaction of factors that often extend well beyond economic motivations. Geopolitical and security-related factors have been especially critical determining factors in this process. Chapter 3 discusses how, for example, ASEAN was originally a construct of Cold War geopolitics with strong support from the United States as a bulwark against the advance of communism in Southeast Asia. The EU’s earliest antecedent, the European Coal and Steel Community, also originated from security-related imperatives, this being to avert another major conflict ever occurring within the region again. Furthermore, depending on relative configurations of membership, regional security organisations and forum can augment the regional community-building endeavours of their economic counterparts, or actually stem from the same organisational stem, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) being an instance of this (see Figure 1.3).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Regional security arrangements can bring greater stability and trust amongst a regional community of nations, without which economic regionalism may be very difficult to achieve. A stable politico-military security environment may be viewed as providing a crucially important ‘public good’ that enables regional co-operation among states to flourish. Conversely, security rivalries and tensions can have adverse effects, dividing regions into competing political and economic blocs, as was essentially the case during the Cold War period. US-led or supported security arrangements such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (1954-1977) and the Asian and Pacific Council (1966-1973) were pitted against the security alliances of communist states like China, Vietnam and North Korea, with the Soviet Union then always present in the background of East Asia’s security theatre. Regional security relations still, however, remain problematic. The ARF, established in 1994, is the closest East Asia has to a regional security arrangement but its prime emphasis is on dialogue and it has achieved relatively little at addressing the main security issues confronting the region.​[8]​ 

There remain considerable differences in the security interests, ideologies and policies of the Asia-Pacific’s ‘great powers’ – China, Japan, Russia and the United States – with each seeking to stamp hegemonic authority in the trans-region. As we discuss in subsequent chapters, since the late 2000s tensions have intensified between the Japanese and Chinese national governments over various issues, and this has not been conducive to advancing state-led regionalism in East Asia (Cheng 2014, Karim 2013, Takeuchi 2014, Webber 2010). This can be generally explained by both countries seeking to establish hegemonic positions in the region, and extend their spheres of influence among common neighbouring countries. Russia’s recent geopolitical assertiveness around its national borders under President Putin’s leadership has been a significant cause for concern among many countries. Although the United States has adopted a more positive engagement with its fellow Asia-Pacific great powers under President Obama (e.g. the Strategic and Economic Dialogue bilateral framework with China) compared to his predecessor, the US still adheres to its right to act as the pre-eminent military superpower on both sides of the Pacific. Its military personnel deployments in Japan (over 49,000) and South Korea (28,500) are ranked first and third in the world respectively for overseas countries. The US 7th Fleet, based in Yokosuka in Japan, is the largest forward-deployed US Navy fleets and comprises a flotilla of up to 70 ships (roughly equivalent to the entire British Royal Navy by the mid-2010s) centred on the USS George Washington nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (complement of 90 combat aircraft plus helicopters) that constantly patrol East Asian maritime waters. Many analysts believe that China’s strategic ambitions may lead to it eventually seriously challenging the US security presence in East Asia, although the Chinese navy’s capacity for blue-water operations may remain limited for a number of years and just a fraction of US capacity (Kim and Lee 2012, O’Rourke 2014). Nevertheless, the decision announced in early 2013 by Washington of concentrating 60 percent of US naval assets in the new strategically linked Indo-Pacific (Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean zone) by 2020 was generally perceived as a strategic reaction to a growing number of Chinese deep water port development projects in the area (Pan 2014, Tow 2014).

Notwithstanding the notable economic, business and geopolitical benefits that the US would enjoy from deepening East Asian regionalism, it has perhaps a more obvious strategic interest in promoting Asia-Pacific regionalism instead, a process over which it can exercise more influence and establish a more direct stakeholding position. (Beeson 2006a, Berger 2006). In recent times, APEC has been as the main institutional vehicle used by the United States for this purpose, but it is a regional organisation that has struggled to realise its primary goals and stay relevant to East Asian states in particular (see Chapters 4 and 5). The US remains a crucial economic, political and security partner to East Asian states. Its social, cultural and ethnic ties with the region remain strong. Much of East Asia still looks to the United States for leadership in regional and global affairs (Agnew 2005, Beeson 2006a, Kelly 2014, Paal 2012). And yet the US has been a more or less peripheral player regarding many important recent developments in East Asia’s regional political economy, especially regarding financial co-operation and regional infrastructure connectivity development (Feigenbaum 2015). 

In addition to the aforementioned general point concerning ‘great power’ geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific, as noted briefly earlier in the chapter there are a number of long-standing territorial disputes and other security tensions that persist in East Asia in particular, many of which have intensified since the publication of this book’s first edition:

	Korean peninsula: focused especially on the unpredictable and belligerent behaviour of North Korea’s leadership and use of ‘nuclear diplomacy’ threats in attempts to leverage gains from others. The North-South border on the Korean peninsula remains the last great border of the Cold War, where around 1.5 million soldiers are stationed, as well as very substantial amounts of military hardware. The now defunct Six Party Talks (2003-2009) between North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States did little to defuse tensions in this area.
	Cross-Straits relations: between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC). The PRC government continues to lay claim to the island territory of Taiwan and seeks to constrain the ROC government’s diplomatic space on the international stage. Despite positive developments in Cross-Straits diplomacy since the early 2010s, both sides remain on a high degree of security alert with amassed military forces and equipment poised against each other. Similar to security tensions in the Korean peninsula, this is another stand-off situation that could possibly lead to a military conflict of major international magnitude.
	South China Sea: eight governments (Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam) have territorial claims – most overlapping – in the world’s second busiest sea-lane. This especially relates to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, where potentially significant oil and gas resources are thought to lie. China’s controversial historic ‘Nine-Dash Line’ territorial claim extends a long distance south of its southern coast, and the country has been the most active in constructing small artificial islands in the South China Sea in attempts to strengthen its presence here. A number of minor naval skirmishes have occurred between claimant nations as they have been scrambling to establish control in this maritime area.
	East China Sea: centres mainly on the territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands but also more broadly over this maritime territory generally, which also is thought to possibly hold substantial oil and gas resources. In November 2013, China announced it was extending its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that overlapped the ADIZs of both Japan and South Korea, sparking a major diplomatic row in Northeast Asia. The US government ordered two B52 bombers to fly partly into China’s extended ADIZ in a show of displeasure over the move, and South Korea retaliated with an incremental extension of its own ADIZ.   
	Dokdo/Takeshima Islands: a long-standing territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan over islands currently occupied by the former. Both nations are in a stand-off situation on the matter, and it continues to hinder the positive development of inter-governmental diplomacy in other areas, such as free trade agreement projects (see Chapter 6). 
	Sabah, Northern Borneo: a dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines concerning the latter’s territorial claim to the eastern part of Sabah, one of Malaysia’s 11 national provinces. This has often soured relations between the two countries in ASEAN regional diplomacy as well as the advancement of BIMP-EAGA sub-regional co-operation.
Increasing pressure in many of these security hotspots in East Asia have been linked to China’s ascendency, this especially being emphasized by neo-realist scholars. The country’s increasing centrality in East Asia’s regional affairs and deepening regional economic interdependence has certainly posed various challenges to Japan and the United States in particular. China’s strategic economic importance to the region, its closer relations cultivated with ASEAN, South Korea and countries from its other regional neighbourhoods, as well as its growing engagement with various regional and multilateral institutions are indicative of expectations concerning the country’s return to its ‘historic position’ as East Asia’s pre-eminent power (Chan 2012, Kim 2014, Shambaugh 2004).Beijing is constantly compelled to assuage the fears of those inside and outside the region that China poses a significant economic and security threat. As this book will explore, the persistence of such anxiety has hindered the advance of East Asian regionalism.

Inextricably linked to the above are questions concerning China, Japan and regional hegemony in East Asia (Calder 2006, Chung 2013, Dent 2008a, Drifte 2006, Takeuchi 2014, Zhao 2004). This is discussed from different theoretical perspectives of international political economy in the following section. As Chapter 5 argues in some detail, Sino-Japanese relations are the primary determinant regarding the future success, or failure, of East Asian regionalism. The two countries dominate the East Asia region to a significant degree with respect to their economic, political and socio-cultural influence. How China and Japan come to terms with each other is of vital importance to the rest of the region. As discussed in considerable detail in Case Study 1.1 that follows, the key indicators of China’s economic rise shown in Table 1.4 provides broad-ranging evidence of both how rapid this rise has been since the early 1990s, and the profound structural changes in economic weight, impact and power within East Asia that have occurred during this time, especially regarding China’s hegemonic position relative to Japan’s. At the same time that these structural changes are occurring, and in addition to the aforementioned diplomatic spats in Sino-Japanese relations, it should too be noted that both countries have along with South Korea expanded ministerial-level sectors of co-operation within the Northeast Asia Trilateral Co-operation (NATC) framework, this being one of the most important new developments in East Asian regionalism to have emerged in the mid-2000s (see Chapter 3).


Case Study 1.1: The Rise of China and its Potential Effects on East Asian Regionalism

China’s rapid economic rise has been astounding, and this is especially apparent when studied in its East Asia regional context. From the late 19th century to the early 1990s, Japan had been the dominant economic power in the region. Table 1.4 shows at the end of this period Japan accounted for very high East Asia total shares regarding most key economic indicators: gross domestic product, or GDP (74.5 percent), exports (39.2 percent), stock market capitalisation (90.0 percent), electricity generation capacity (45.0 percent), international air transport departures (35.9 percent), patent and trademark applications by residents (95.6 percent and 54.0 percent respectively) and high-tech exports (56.0 percent). However, Japan’s long and flat recovery after the deep economic recession at this time has coincided with the inexorable economic ascendance of China. As Table 1.4 details, the pace of China’s rise across most of the same key economic indicators has been staggering. This has had a number of significant effects. First, China has become the dominant economic force in East Asia, supplanting Japan’s long-held leading positions. Second, China’s rise has relegated Japan’s economic rankings not just regionally but also globally. Third, China’s economic weight is now so substantial that combined with sustained high economic growth rates it has driven forward East Asia’s own economic growth, manifested on various fronts. This has only served to further highlight Japan’s flat economic growth and drive down its shares of the East Asia regional totals.

Rapid growth and expansion of China’s economic related activity is evident in all key indicator areas shown in Table 1.4. From the early 1990s to the early 2010s, China had for example achieved a 29-fold increase in its nominal GDP, 17-fold increase in international air transport departures, over 80-fold increase in the value of its exports (including around a 130-fold increase in high-tech exports), 120-fold plus increase in new patent applications, 135-fold increase in foreign exchange reserves, and approaching almost a 2,000-fold increase in its stock market capitalisation level. Across almost all key indicators, Table 1.4 shows that China now accounts for at least 50 percent of East Asia regional economic aggregates, and in some cases around 60 to 80 percent. As a country, China does have inherent and very sizeable ‘critical mass’ advantages over Japan with respect to population and resource factors. Historically speaking, China has also for most of recorded human history been the world’s largest and most advanced economy. Thus, it has just returned to its ‘natural’ position of predominance regionally and significance globally. Furthermore, China’s burgeoning economic development on multiple fronts has implications not just for its growing economic power and weight but in addition to how this development is impacting on key global challenges facing humanity in the 21st century such as climate change and energy security. Over the last two decades, the country has risen to top the global rankings in electricity generation capacity, energy use and carbon dioxide emission levels (Table 1.4).

So what does China’s rise and increasingly dominant economic position in East Asia mean for the region? This depends of course to a large extent on whether the country’s high rates of economic growth will be sustained into the future. If so, and given its critical mass advantages over others, its dominance is likely to become even stronger and key economic indicator shares rise still further. In such a scenario, it could be argued that China would increasingly become a proxy for the East Asia economy, in effect becoming the region economically. Here, analysts could talk about China and ‘the rest of East Asia’ or even China representing East Asia per se. To some extent, the analytical focus on East Asia as an emerging post-Cold War economic region with a large collection of fast growing ‘tiger’ economies, including China, has shifted to an increasing preoccupation with China alone. We can refer to this as a ‘de-regionalising’ effect, which is also arising in other parts of the world where certain aforementioned regional powers (e.g. India in South Asia, South Africa in Southern Africa, and Nigeria in West Africa) are likewise increasingly dominating their home regions. 

However, this all assumes that China does not experience severe economic shocks and malaise that lead to relative decline. Moreover, as Japan itself knows from its own experience, growing economic weight does not always lead to a commensurate increase in geopolitical and diplomatic influence. Although other East Asian states have on the whole developed closer and more multifaceted relations with China as a functional outcome of the latter’s remarkable economic ascendancy, we noted earlier how China’s rise has also been associated with intensifying diplomatic tensions in the region, anxiety over how the Chinese government is currently exercising its hegemonic influence, and might possibly exercise this in forthcoming years. 






1. How has China achieved its rapid economic rise, and what structural change has this brought about within East Asia?






1.5 International Political Economy Theories and Regionalism

1.5.1 The Usefulness of International Political Economy Analysis

This book studies East Asian regionalism from an international political economy (IPE) analytical perspective. Our discussions above on the security and geopolitical dimensions to East Asian regionalism drew upon a number of disciplinary perspectives, mainly international relations, political science and economics. The study of international political economy (IPE) may be primarily considered the fusion of these three core fields into a multi-disciplinary framework. This makes IPE especially useful for analysing regionalism given its multi-faceted nature. In this section, key concepts and theoretical perspectives of IPE are introduced that are most relevant to studying the various themes of East Asian regionalism. These will also provide the main analytical framework for each chapter’s concluding section, the main purpose of this exercise being to understand the chapter’s subject matter from different theoretical and analytical viewpoints. This will provide the reader with a more critically informed overview of what has been studied in the chapter.

Strange (1994) has perhaps offered the best generic definition of IPE, in that it “concerns the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange, and distribution and the mix of values reflected therein” (pg. 18). International political economy analysis emerged from the 1970s onwards as a subset discipline of international relations. However, scholars from various fields have been drawn to IPE analysis partly because the analytical tools from their own discipline could not adequately explain certain phenomena arising within the world system. For example, economists using their conventional theoretical and conceptual frameworks could not fully explain the effect of political and social factors in the determination of trade policy formation, patterns of international economic exchange (e.g. trade, foreign investment), multinational enterprise (MNE) behaviour, and so on. 

Certain developments in the international arena during the 1970s provided impetus to IPE studies, including the 1973/74 oil shock, stagflation (i.e. high inflation combined with stagnant economic activity) amongst Western countries, Japan’s ascendancy as the world’s next economic superpower and the growing global impact of the European Community. IPE came increasingly to the fore of international studies with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing shift from politico-ideological competition to economic competition (n.b. from geopolitics to geoeconomics) that the 1990s brought. The integrative forces of globalisation and regionalism strengthened not only material linkages within the world system but also issue-linkage between economic, political, environmental and societal phenomena on increasingly extensive scales. International political economy analysis has proved particularly useful in studying both material and issue-based linkages. Let us demonstrate the usefulness of the IPE analytical approach with two examples. The first concerns how can IPE help us understand issues relating to Japan’s persistently large trade surpluses with the United States and to a lesser extent the EU:

	Source of the trade imbalance: this may be explained by the country’s effective trade-industry policies, informal kinds of protectionism in Japan (e.g. economic nationalism), Japanese MNE strategies, issues of relative competitiveness between Japan, the US and EU, e.g. productivity, education and skills levels.
	Reaction from the US and EU: how and why have American and European domestic industry groups (e.g. steel, autos) lobbied governments for protectionist counter-measures?
	Managing the trade diplomacy conflict: diplomatic measures and strategies deployed by the US and EU in terms of unilateral measures (e.g. tariffs), bilateral diplomacy (i.e. direct negotiation with Japan) and multilateral diplomacy (e.g. WTO) to redress their respective trade imbalances with Japan.

Our second example concerns the ASEAN – China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) signed in November 2002. What were the economic, political and security motivations behind ACFTA? Were any of these motivations more important than the others, and can or should they be disaggregated in the first place? Does ACFTA reflect China’s aspirations for regional leadership in East Asia? What economic motives do ASEAN countries have for promoting ACFTA? Furthermore, how can we explain Japan’s reaction to ACFTA with reference to international diplomacy, politics and economics? Finally, the above questions lead us to consider what impacts will ACFTA have on East Asian regionalism. These questions are best addressed by IPE analysis.

1.5.2 Applying Key IPE Theories and Concepts to the Study of Regionalism






Neo-realism derives from realist theory of international relations, whose historic roots can be found in the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbs and others. It is founded on the realist assumption that nation-states remain the most important IPE actor, and all other actors are essentially subordinate to their power and interests. Moreover, nation-states are essentially competitive power maximisers, leading to inter-state anarchical relations within the international system. The strength of nationalist sentiment and historical mistrust amongst East Asian countries was noted earlier in the chapter, and neo-realists tend to stress how these factors pose significant constraints on regional community-building. While neo-realists accept that inter-state coalitions (e.g. ASEAN) can arise, they argue these only serve to realise various national interests. Thus, according to neo-realists, ventures into regionalism are simply a projection of nation-state interests onto a broader international canvas. For example, Malaysia champions ASEAN as an organisation and its group interests in East Asia and the wider world because it is in Malaysia’s interests to do so. Neo-realism suggests that Malaysia has used ASEAN as a vehicle to advance the country’s own national position, status and influence in East Asia and in the international arena generally. Similarly, neo-realists would argue that China and Japan’s promotion of East Asian regionalism derives from competing interests in leading a future East Asian regional group, such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT).

Following on from these assumptions concerning nation-state behaviour, neo-realism contends that states have a preference for relative gains over other states rather than higher net absolute gains achieved from co-operative inter-state actions

. We can illustrate this by use of a simple example. Suppose that the current distribution of trading power ‘points’ between the Northeast Asian states was this: Japan 7; China 9; South Korea 4. The three countries then estimate that after forming a regional free trade area between them the distribution of trading power ‘points’ would change to: Japan 10; China 11; South Korea 8. Neo-realists suggest that even though China stands to realise an absolute gain of 2 points (9 to 11), it will not promote the regional free trade area because its international position relative to Japan will worsen (+2 to +1) as will that to South Korea (+5 to +3). Now suppose if revised estimates on a Northeast Asian FTA’s gains suggest the following distribution: Japan 9, China 13, and South Korea 6. According to neo-realists China now has an incentive to promote the free trade area because its relative international position will have consequently improved (Japan: +2 to +4; South Korea: +5 to +7). However, if Japan and South Korea’s leaders also think along similar neo-realist lines then they in turn will not promote this regional project based on these revised estimates. The main conclusion here is that when such neo-realist thinking is pervasive among many states then regional co-operation is more difficult to achieve.

A further premise of neo-realist theory is that while it accepts that international structures can condition the behaviour of nation-states, these in turn are ultimately determined by the interaction of nation-states themselves. So, for example, East Asian countries may act in accordance with WTO or FTA rules on trade policy but at the same time certain countries may have the power and influence to shape those rules to suit their own national interests. Within this theoretical tradition, realists essentially championed the primacy of nation-states whereas neo-realists are also concerned with systemic structure (Waltz 1979, Gilpin 1984). 

The so called ‘English School’ of international relations and hegemonic stability theory (HST) are both examples of the latter. English School thinking proposes that nation-states form the basic units of an ‘inter-national’ society in which countries work together to solve common problems whilst retaining the inviolable rights of national sovereignty. International society is itself, however, more than the sum of its parts, and state behaviour is subject to the rules, norms, values and institutions that constitute international society generally. The same can apply on a regional scale, and hence this is relevant to the formation of regional organisations and frameworks like ASEAN and APT, yet nation-states nevertheless remain the prime object of analysis to most English School theorists.

Hegemonic stability theory (HST) meanwhile contends that hegemonic states play a stabilising role in the international economic system, bringing harmony where there was hitherto anarchy (Kindleberger 1973, Krasner 1976, Lake 1991, Milner 1998). Britain is supposed to have played this hegemonic stability role in the 19th Century, and this onerous responsibility passed onto the United States during the 20th Century – Pax Britannica and Pax Americana respectively. Initially these states underwrite an open trading system from which they benefit, owing to their own competitive advantages they can successfully exploit within that system more than any other nation-state. Owing to this power they are able to compel and pressure others to support them in this task, and here we see the hegemon’s exercise of structural power: the ability to influence and shape international structures and the rules of the game that other countries must abide by (Strange 1994, Tuathail and Agnew 1992). However, as the hegemonic state losses its power so it takes increasing recourse to trade protectionism and even refuge in a regional trade bloc, over which it can still exercise effective power and dominance. As other countries retaliate with their own trade protectionism, and also form their own regional trade blocs as a counter-measure, so instability and fragmentation of the international economic system occurs. Hegemonic stability theorists point to the inter-war period (1918-1939) when rising protectionism and bloc formation contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War, and also more recently to the US, its creeping trade protectionism and unilateralism (in reaction to a burgeoning trade deficit from the 1970s onwards) and entrenchment within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ‘bloc’. 

While HST can appear somewhat simplistic and over-generalised, it may help explain the rise of regionalism as the world shifted from ‘hegemonic stability’ to multi-polarity. The decision taken by ASEAN states in the early 1990s to form their Free Trade Area (AFTA) was partly based on concerns over the impact that NAFTA and the EU’s Single Market programme would have on their trading positions, especially when close industrial rivals such as Mexico and Central and East Europe were expected to gain preferential access to the world’s two largest markets. The emergence and development of APT may also be seen as reaction to this general shift to multi-polarity, and the sense that East Asia – as one of the world’s three powerful ‘triad’ regions – does not have its own FTA or single market arrangement yet. In this sense, neo-realists may argue that regional trade blocs are merely projections of the competitive power-maximising behaviour of nation-states, working collectively to improve their relative international position over another regional collective or collectives of nation-states. In another words, East Asian states are only collaborating with each other in order to compete more effectively against states from other regions. 


(ii) Neo-liberalism, Neo-liberal Institutionalism

Neo-liberal theories of international political economy are founded on the ‘classic’ liberal notions of individual self-determination and utility-maximising rationality. From this, for example, derives the laissez faire principles of free trade and comparative advantage. Classic liberal theory contends that it is private organisations (i.e. firms) that trade with each other, not nation-states as such, and hence liberals emphasise individuals and private organisations as the most significant actors in the international economic system. From this leads a preoccupation with competition between firms, rather than inter-state competition, and the primacy of markets over states. Indeed, ‘state power’ (i.e. governments) versus ‘market power’ (i.e. firms, private capital) has become a core IPE issue in the era of globalisation, especially after the various financial crises that arose during the 1990s, e.g. the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992/93, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994/95, and perhaps most importantly the 1997/98 East Asian financial crisis. East Asia’s financial crisis clearly revealed how international financiers and currency speculators could prevail over most of the region’s central bank authorities who were trying to counteract downward global market pressure on their national currencies. It came down to a question of sheer financial power: private international financiers simply had more money to throw into market interactions than most government’s had when attempting to manage an exchange rate policy. More recently, the 2008/09 global financial crisis demonstrated the power of banks, in relation to causing national economies to fall into deep recession and near bankruptcy, as well as their ability to circumvent the regulatory functions of national governments.  

Neo-liberalism extends the theoretical foundations of classic liberal theory. For example, neo-liberalism stresses how non-state actors per se (not just individuals and firms) play an increasingly important role in the contemporary international economic order. This can include transnational actors, such as representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), officials from supranational or international agencies, or MNE business executives. Moreover, even where state-centric negotiations determine actual outcomes, trans-governmental coalitions may evolve between like-minded state officials whose own self-serving interests may not necessarily be aligned to the state they are supposed to represent (Risse-Kappen 1995). For example, trade diplomats from around the East Asian region may have more in common with each other than say their own government colleagues working in domestic-oriented ministries. Some of these trade diplomats will have gone to the same American, European or Asian university for their postgraduate degree, and they may share similar views on how the international system and international relations should be managed. Neo-liberals would suggest it is from such elite policy-maker networks across different governments that the ideas and initiatives for regional economic co-operation and integration can derive. We shall see later how there are links here with social constructivist theory. More generally, neo-liberalism contends that the growth in both the number and scope of international organisations, together with the new inter-linkages forged by globalisation, has broadened the nature of transnational relations and introduced greater complexity to the governance of international economic relations. 

While there exists a strong neo-liberal consensus against state intervention, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that states need to co-operate to both redress market failure at the international level and jointly provide the public goods required for the international economic system to function in a non-anarchical fashion. This of course applies at various levels, for example at the global-multilateral level such as the Kyoto Protocol on reducing carbon emissions, and at the regional level through the work of regional organisations. Moreover, in contrast to neo-realist theory, neo-liberal institutionalism maintains that while international organisations may owe their origins to hegemonic power, they are not subsequently dependent upon it once they become established. This is partly due to them creating the conditions in the international economic system that helps legitimise their own independent raison d’etre. Thus, global-multilateral and regional organisations have become more than just the sum of their nation-state members. Some neo-liberals, however, play down the importance of institutionalised co-operation by arguing that “international organisations are not the causes of co-operation but mechanisms through which co-operation occurs” (Haggard and Moravcsik 1993: 285). Thus, the institutionalist wing of neo-liberal theory has often been treated as a separate theory. 

According to neo-liberal institutionalists, then, regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, APT and NATC are founded on the above premises of co-operative behaviour. Indeed, managing the complex interdependence between sets of closely connected nation-states (e.g. within the same region) is a key theme of neo-liberal theory analysis, especially its neo-liberal institutionalist strand. Keohane and Nye (1977) developed the notion of complex interdependence as a critique of the neo-realist worldview that states behave in a largely autonomous manner, proposing instead that independent state strategies are often not viable. This largely derived from the neo-liberal observation that multiple transnational channels connect societies, or sections of societies, across different nation-states and has become increasingly relevant in the era of globalisation. We can see various instances today where globalisation and our expanding knowledge and observation of transnationalised activities and issues can make it difficult to disaggregate national allegiances, identities and interests. Consider the following examples:

	Southeast Asia’s ‘haze’ pollution problem: pollution respects no national boundaries and ASEAN member-states have been compelled to tackle this at a regional level.
	East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98: the crisis exposed the lack of regional co-operation mechanisms to address the ‘contagion’ spread of currency market turmoil from one country to another.
	SARS virus​[9]​ outbreak of 2002/03: very similar to the above. Again, East Asian countries met soon after the outbreak to formulate regional-level solutions for containing and eradicating the virus. 
	Hydropower development in South China and the Mekong sub-region: China and continental Southeast Asian countries share the Mekong river and other riparian resources that straddle national borders. Sub-regional co-operation is required to manage these common resources most effectively and sustainably.
	Other ‘new’ transnational security issues: including drug-trafficking, economic migration and refugee flows.







Social constructivism is a relatively new strand of IPE theory that also crosses over into international relations theory more generally. Essentially, it stresses the importance of ideas, values, beliefs, identity-formation in IPE analysis. In this sense it offers non-materialistic perspectives on both why things happen in the international economic system and how we may interpret events and developments within that system. In other words, these may be understood via our ‘social’ or ‘ideational’ construction of IPE phenomena, relationships and so on. Moreover, according to social constructivists it is the contestation of ideas rather than that of vested interests that primarily shape today’s IPE. As John Maynard Keynes – the greatest economist of the 20th Century –famously stated in his highly influential book, The General Theory: 

“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.” (Keynes 1936: 383)

Keynes was essentially arguing that all theories and policies are essentially derivatives of certain ideas or beliefs, whether it is free trade, liberty, democracy, community, individualism and even the idea of a region or ‘regionness’. We would not, for instance, be studying East Asian regionalism if ideas of ‘East Asia’ or ‘regionalism’ had themselves not been constructed over many years and decades of analytical discourse. As Katzenstein (2000) argued, regions are more than the physical flow of goods and people within a defined regional space: regions are also social and cognitive constructs, focusing on how peoples from different nations within a defined geographic space commonly associate around a shared sense of region. To Jayasuriya (1994), regionalism “is a set of cognitive practices shaped by language and political discourse, which through the creation of concepts, metaphors, analogies, determine how the region is defined; these serve to define the actors who are included (and excluded) within the region and thereby enable the emergence of a regional entity and identity” (pg. 412). In addition, Hurrell (1995) talks about the notion of regional community being the development of the region “into an active subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised or informal actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society, transcending old state borders” (pg. 466).


In international comparative terms, the sense of ‘regionness’ is arguably strongest in Europe, especially continental Europe. The creation of the euro has consolidated European regional identity-formation still further. Whilst East Asia remains a highly diverse region, one could argue that the sense of East Asian regionness and regional identity-formation, especially amongst its most educated and travelled peoples, has grown in recent years. This may be viewed from two main phase perspectives. First, the regional economic dynamic experienced by many of the region’s states led to both East Asians themselves and also those from outside the region to develop holistic explanations of the East Asian economic ‘miracle’. In other words, what was it about East Asia as a region and East Asians generally that made it and them so successful in development terms? This helped create a sense of regional cohesion, and to some extent a sense of regional community amongst East Asians themselves, especially amongst the region’s elite groups, e.g. policy-makers, business leaders and academics. 

Second, one could argue that it was (ironically) the supposed end of East Asia’s economic miracle with the arrival of the 1997/98 financial crisis that further consolidated the idea of East Asian regionalism. The financial crisis was an experience shared by many people from the East Asia region, and moreover it clearly revealed that important economic, political and social inter-linkages bound them together in some way. Regional crises, and the shared imperative to avoid another one, can therefore provide the societal or public support needed in the development of new regionalist projects. The origins and development of the European Community / Union may be broadly understood in this way (after two World Wars), and the APT process may also be understood in similar terms (after a significant financial and economic crisis). 

Social constructivism also stresses the importance of various societal developments occurring at the micro-level in the ‘social construction’ of regions, which could be described as socio-cultural regionalisation processes. The emergence of pan-regional social and cultural movements in East Asia is now closely linked to debates concerning regional identity-formation. This relates to various aspects of Asian popular culture, such as Japanese cartoons and karaoke, Korean pop music, Star TV, Chinese and Korean television shows, multinational Asian singing groups, Asian fusion food, and so on. Pempel (2005b) argues that the growing pan-Asian appeal of these cultural products is creating at least a rudimentary basis of regional popular identity, and moreover observes that, “From cartoons to karaoke and from pop music to internet sites, such youth-oriented popular culture now bleeds across East Asia’s national borders in ways unimaginable two decades ago” (pg. 24). 

Furthermore, intra-regional social and cultural exchange has been gathering momentum in East Asia in terms of movement of people, international student exchange, foreign travel, and trade in cultural goods, e.g. music, film (METI 2005). These developments in regional socialisation all contribute in some way to regional identity-formation in East Asia. Certain social constructivists have also argued that inter-regional links, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework and the East Asia – Latin America Forum (EALAF), are based on, and help further define regional identity formation. This is mainly because such interaction develops respective senses of regional ‘we-ness’ and ‘them-ness’ (Gilson 2002). According to the social constructivist view, then, the more that East Asia as a region interacts in a collective or coalitional sense with other macro-regions, the more regional identity-formation can be expected to develop. Of course, inter-societal tensions among the peoples of East Asia will have the opposite effect, especially when based on assertive expressions of nationalism such as public demonstrations in one country against the alleged wrongdoings of another, e.g. over territorial disputes.


(iv) Marxism and Structuralism

The intellectual origins of Marxism derive from the writings of 19th Century political economist Karl Marx. Marxist theory postulates that classes are the dominant actors in the world system. Similar to neo-realists, Marxists contend that international economic relations are essentially conflictual in nature because of inherent inter-class frictions that arise between capital and labour, and in particular from the capitalist exploitation of workers. According to Marxist thought, the prevailing hierarchy in the international economic system is determined not by politico-military power, as neo-realists suggest, but rather by the patterns of production and exchange established by the global capitalist system. Globalisation has further enhanced the power of capital, and consequently strengthened the influence of firms over state economic policy, a point that neo-liberals would also generally agree on in the context of the ‘states versus markets’ debate. 

Marxist scholars such as Wallerstein (1979) have emphasised the historical perspective on the development of global capitalism when studying contemporary international economic relations. Marx himself wrote much on the relationship between the expansion of internationalised capital interests and imperialism. In the post-colonial era, the Marxist interpretation of transnational class conflict has moved on to place greater emphasis on MNE competition for global market shares, thus branding them as the new imperialist actors or agents of neo-colonialism. Following on from this argument, Marxists generally contend that state-led regionalist initiatives and frameworks such as ASEAN, APT, NATC and APEC are merely attempts by the transnational capital class (e.g. MNE executives, state policy-makers, international financiers) to consolidate or advance capitalist development in accordance with their interests. Free trade agreements are also viewed in the same way as they break down the barriers to the growth and expansion of transnational capitalism.

Marxists take a similar view on regionalisation, emphasising how multinational enterprises use their market power to play off workforces against each other within international production networks (IPNs) so as to drive down labour costs and maximise economic rents, e.g. profits. The so called ‘new international division of labour’ (NIDL) has been facilitated by two main developments (Frobel et al 1980). The first relates to advances in transport and communication technologies that have enabled the co-ordinated management of production networks and labour forces across national borders. The second concerns how new process technologies have fragmented and standardised specific tasks that can be more easily contracted out to developing countries with low labour costs. Consequently, greater scope has emerged for competition between workforces from developed and developing country locations, which MNEs exploit to their advantage. Marxists suggest that this can be observed very clearly on a regional scale, and moreover explains patterns of regionalisation in East Asia and elsewhere. As stated earlier in this chapter, regionalisation derives from market or business determined interactions within particular regional spaces. In this context, MNEs are exploiting their capital advantages over national borders, and in doing so linking up different parts of the region’s economy through various NIDL-based activities. Chapter 2 examines how companies such as Toyota make their products on a regional division of labour involving a number of East Asian countries. For example, large multinationals like Toyota are able to set countries to competitively bid for different sub-contracted production elements in order that the company secures the best terms and conditions, e.g. investment tax-breaks, pre-skilled up labour, a more ‘flexible’ regulatory environment.

Structuralist perspectives and theories of IPE draw upon certain Marxist premises outlined above, as well as dependency theory and world-system theory. Structuralism stresses the importance of economic, political and social structures in explaining the nature of the world economic system (Wallerstein 1978, 1979; Chase-Dunn 1989). In terms of international economic structures we particularly mean those of production, finance, technology and knowledge. It shares similarities with the Marxist view of economic history, stressing the particular division of labour that has evolved in the world economy based on the growth of capitalism as the dominant form of production. In analysing the structure of the world economic system, structuralism draws upon dependency theory to explain the persisting gap between developed and developing country areas. This theory states that the core-periphery divide between advanced industrialised countries (i.e. the ‘core’) and under-developed countries (i.e. the ‘periphery’) is sustained by subservient economic relationships in which the latter remain dependent upon the former for capital, technology, finance and trade. This relationship of ‘unequal exchange’ endures because it is in the interests of dominant capitalist forces – or transnational capital class as Marxists would more specifically identify – to maintain the status quo. Indeed, the persisting gap between the developed countries (Europe, North America) and developing country regions (Africa, Latin America, Central and South Asia) seems to support the general case for structural rigidity in the international economic system. 







This chapter first looked at the emergence of East Asia as an increasingly important region in the international economic system, and considered questions relating to defining its ‘regionness’. It was argued that East Asia’s regional coherence has become gradually stronger over the long-term, despite the various political, socio-cultural, economic and security-related impediments ranged against this. We looked at the key concepts and definitions of regionalism, particularly looking at how we may distinguish some concepts and definitions from others, for example regionalisation from state-led regionalism. The intermeshing of these concepts and definitions (e.g. economic and political regionalism) was also noted. Thereafter, we examined how the study of regionalism has evolved over time from the Euro-centric theories of ‘classic regionalism’ to the more recently emergent ‘new regionalism theory’ paradigms, which take into account much broader understandings of how, why and where regionalising processes are formed. 

This was followed by a discussion on how regionalism has manifested itself in the international system. We first considered the linkages between regionalism and globalisation, and how they may be thought of as being as being part of similar integrative processes occurring within the world but on different geo-spatial scales, i.e. regional and global. Secondly, we examined how regional economic organisations and frameworks have spread and developed within the international system, noting that East Asia is a relative latecomer compared to most other regions in this regard. However, the creation of ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS) and Northeast Asia Trilateral Co-operation (NATC) regional frameworks are important developments with potentially significant implications for the wider international community. 







1.	Why is regionalism such a contested concept?

2.	How and why has regionalism manifested itself in different ways within the international system?

3.	Why have many aspects of East Asian regionalism been so slow to develop in comparison to other global regions?

4.	What different actors may be involved in East Asian regionalism, and identify what their specific interests and influence are likely to be in regionalist projects.


























^1	  Those who have a preference for this geographic distinction tend to be specialists in Southeast Asian, Chinese or Japanese studies.
^2	  Special Administrative Region.
^3	  CFA is derived from the term Colonies françaises d'Afrique (‘French colonies of Africa’).
^4	  For Athukorala (2003), globalisation essentially concerns “the deepening structural interdependence of the world economy” (pg. 1). Scholte (2001) comments that, “Globalisation refers to processes whereby many social relations become relatively de-linked from territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly played out in a world as a single place. Social relations – that is, the countless and complex ways that people interact and affect each other – are more and more being conducted and organised on the basis of a planetary unit.” (pgs. 14-15).
^5	  World Trade Organisation rules only permit developing countries to enter into such agreements under the so called ‘Enabling Clause’. For a discussion on this, see Dent (2006a).
^6	  See Chapter 8 for a discussion on the distinctions between regional organisations and frameworks.
^7	  This mostly related to agricultural, textile and petrochemical sectors. The Bangkok Agreement was originally an initiative of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and is Asia's oldest preferential trade agreement. India, Bangladesh, South Korea, Laos and Sri Lanka were the Bangkok Agreement's founding members, with China acceding in 2001. 
^8	  The ARF essentially brings together a number of ASEAN’s main ‘dialogue partners’ (the US, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and the EU) to discuss security-related issues in general. Its work is augmented by ‘track II’ arrangements such as CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) meetings and workshops where government officials, other organisational representatives and specialists discuss various security-related issues.
^9	  SARS stands for ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’.
